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Introduction
The purported differences between "hard" and "soft" approaches to IS development are often said to
depend on whether or not IS analysis (and design) is primarily concerned with clarifying "objective"
notions of reality, or gaining an understanding of "subjective" perceptions of reality. The concepts of
subject and object are often seen as being opposed to one another. The Frankfurt School philosopher,
Theodore Adorno (1903-1969) developed the (inter-related) concepts of mediated objectivity and critical
subjectivity. These are introduced here to provide a more critical (philosophical) underpinning for IS
development than either objectivity or subjectivity (conceived as fundamentally opposed categories), and it
will be argued that a legitimate separation can be made between the subjects (who carry out the analysis)
and the objects in the study. It will be concluded that whilst reality may well be considered objective, "the
subject" makes possible the idea of critique - of a critical interpretation of reality. Therefore, IS developers
can be seen as being both constrained (by economic realities) and empowered to take responsibility for
some of the decisions which affect the lives of members of the organisations in which information systems
are developed.

Information Systems as Subjective Constructs
A contemporary tendency exists which treats information systems as, essentially, subjective "constitutions"
(constructions); this approach is often derived from the Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) advocates (e.g.
Checkland, 1981; Checkland and Scholes, 1990). Such approaches to understanding IS development are
purported to be based on a "phenomenological" (as opposed to a "positivistic") philosophical underpinning.
Checkland explicitly states that SSM is underpinned by the work of Edmund Husserl (1869-1938):
Functionalism is part of the Durkheimian (or positivistic) tradition in sociology. Soft systems methodology
implies, rather, a model of social reality such as is found in the alternative (phenomenological) tradition
deriving sociologically from Weber and philosophically from Husserl. (Checkland, 1981, p. 19)
Checkland's, arguments centre around the claim that information systems are not "real" in the everyday
sense of the word, but are - rather - subjective constructions, i.e. they exist in consciousness rather than in
the external world. Bernet et. al. (1993) provide an account of Husserl's work, but this will not be discussed
further. Checkland insists that:
[C]larity demands that we be very careful about the difference between ontological statements of the form:
the perceived world is something or other, and epistemological statements which are not about the
perceived world but are about knowing the perceived world. Thus, in an epistemological statement we are
only saying that the perceived world may be taken to be ... something or other. The difference between is
and may be taken to be is very important. So these epistemological statements are about knowing the world
not about the world itself. (Checkland, 1992, pp. 1026-1027).

Checkland is arguing that systems are subjective epistemological constructs. This view has recently been
expressed forcefully by Crowe, et. al. (1996), who further argue:
[A]dopting a constructivist philosophy means giving up realism ... constructivism is not to be viewed as an
ontological position but an epistemological one. (Crowe, et. al., 1996, p. 49)
In the above quotation, the debt to Checkland's work is clearly apparent.
Now, although subjective judgements clearly have a role to play within IS development (e.g. in ethical
concerns), treating information systems as subjective constructs runs the risk of falling into the trap of all
subjectivist (idealist) philosophy; the trap of needing to pose real "worlds behind" the apparent world which somehow "produce" or "cause" consciousness to experience certain things - but which are
themselves strictly unknowable - "ultimately unknowable external reality" to use Lewis's (1994, p. 179)
phrase. However, it is (fairly) clear that information systems are not purely subjective constructs - they
have objective features such as databases, storage media, etc. It can be argued that there is a good reason
why these features should not be construed as "worlds behind appearances", as to do so would give these
features an almost magical unintelligibility - and this would give IS developers a feeling of powerlessness
in the face of the unknown (and, from a subjectivist's perspective, the unknowable). Adorno characterised
the paradox of subjective idealism thus:
He who interprets by searching behind the phenomenal world for a world-in-itself (Welt an sich) which
forms its foundation and support, acts mistakenly like someone who wants to find in the riddle the
reflection of a being which lies behind it, a being mirrored in the riddle, in which it is contained. (Adorno,
1977, p. 127)
The subjective idealist must posit the existence of things which he/she has concluded a priori are
unknowable! To return to more practical matters, it may well be a sensible strategy to treat the computer as
a "black box", if this results in an increase in our ability to design new information systems with greater
freedom than would otherwise be the case. But, if the final design is to utilise a computer, then it will surely
prove beneficial to understand (broadly) the capabilities of the technology that is to be utilised. The
approach of treating information systems as being subjective constructs is clearly a reaction to the
prevailing positivistic orthodoxy - but it is not necessarily a constructive reaction as it could actually limit
the intelligibility of the development environment - as argued above.

Adorno on Subject and Object
The distinction drawn between subject and object by the (SSM-influenced) IS academics (discussed above)
is taken by them to be methodologically fundamental; hard systems thinking is associated with objectivism
whilst soft systems thinking is associated with subjectivism, and it is claimed by them that such positions
are incompatible (based on different philosophical paradigms etc.). What often goes unnoticed is that such
a view implies an a priori "binary opposition" meta-view of subjectivism and objectivism, but it would
seem fairly trivial to argue that the world is neither simply "out there" to be understood immediately; nor is
it completely and utterly "made up" by us; in which case what is needed is a more appropriate theory of
subject and object. Adorno considered that a legitimate separation can be made between the subjects (who
carry out analysis in general) and the objects in the area studied, but he thought that - generally - this
distinction is not made in an appropriate manner:
The separation of subject and object is both real and illusory. True, because in the cognitive realm it serves
to express the real separation, the dichotomy of the human condition, a coercive development. False,
because the resulting separation must not be hypostatised, not magically transformed into an invariant.
(Adorno, 1978, pp. 498-499)
Adorno considers that "the subject" makes possible the idea of critique - of a critical interpretation of
reality. But in his view the concept of "the subject" is an intellectual construction - an abstraction - derived
from (and not prior to) actual, real, living individuals:

It is evident that the abstract concept of the transcendental subject - its thought forms, their unity, and the
original productivity of consciousness - presupposes what it promises to bring about: actual, live
individuals. (Adorno, 1978, p. 500)
It should be noted that this is a Nietzschean argument (e.g. Nietzsche, 1956, pp. 178-180), and this debt is
acknowledged by Adorno (1982). Now although we can treat the subject as real (or "standing in for" real,
live individuals), in Adorno's view the subject does not "make the world up" (this is often termed
constructivism - Adorno uses the term "constitute" instead of construct):
While our images of perceived reality may very well be Gestalten, the world in which we live is not; it is
constituted differently than out of mere images of perception (Adorno, 1977, p. 126)
However, Adorno does not argue for a return to "vulgar objectivism", because this would deny the
possibility of a critical interpretation of the objective circumstances.

Mediated Objectivity
The objective world is real enough, but what we see is always mediated by concepts (although we may not
be aware of this all of the time):
What must be eliminated is the illusion that ... the totality of consciousness, is the world, and not the selfcontemplation of knowledge. The last thing the critique of epistemology ... is supposed to do is proclaim
unmediated objectivism. (Adorno, 1982, p. 27)
In the earlier quotation (above) concerning "perceived reality", what Adorno means by "constituted
differently" is that the world is, to a large extent, determined by economic realities, which he sometimes
refers to using the term exchange:
The living human individual, as he is forced to act in the role for which he has been marked internally as
well, is the homo oeconomicus incarnate, closer to the transcendental subject than to the living individual
for which he immediately cannot but take himself... What shows up in the doctrine of the transcendental
subject is the priority of the relations - abstractly rational ones, detached from the human individuals and
their relationships - that have their model in exchange. If the exchange form is the standard social structure,
its rationality constitutes people; what they are for themselves, what they seem to be for themselves, is
secondary. (Adorno, 1978, p. 501)
For Adorno (as for IS professionals) the world of economic activity is very real:
Somebody pays for what analysts and designers deliver. New systems have to be justified by the benefits
that they deliver. It is easy to use terms like "the users" and "user management" ... and forget that they are
subtitles for "the customer". (Yeates, et al, 1994, p. 2)
In fact, the systems analyst should be seen not purely as some sort of enquiring transcendental subject, but
as an economically-constituted actuality.

Critical Subjectivity
Adorno argued that critique is only possible if sufficient status is given to the subject who can become
critically aware of these sort of circumstances; therefore Adorno preserves a critical role for the subject:
To use the strength of the subject to break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity ... Stringently to
transcend the official separation of pure philosophy and the substantive or formally scientific realm ...
(Adorno, 1973, p. xx)

At the very least, the economic activities which generate systems development projects have a key
determining role on the analysts' foci of attention in the project, and systems analysts do not generate
knowledge purely in the interest of advancing science. However, despite economic pressures to conform to
a certain view of the organisations in which we are immersed, we are all sometimes able to see problems
with the actually existing set of arrangements. Critical subjectivity (and mediated objectivity) is what
allows us to both perceive what is "real" in these situations, and to conceive of how these situations may be
changed - either for our benefit, or for the benefit of all (or, more realistically perhaps, the majority). Such a
perspective would enable IS researchers to conceive IS developers as being both constrained (by economic
realities) and empowered to take responsibility for some of the decisions which affect the lives of the nonIS members of the organisations in which information systems are developed; such a view would not
denigrate the importance of acquiring a solid understanding of the technical aspects of the development
environment.

Conclusion
The "binary opposition" meta-view that IS methods should be either "subjectivist" or "objectivist" is both
dangerous and fallacious; the subject is necessary for critical interpretations of the actual economicobjective world to be developed. To sum up, the subject mediates but does not constitute the object (i.e. the
IS). This implies that neither a hard or soft approach to IS development will be adequate if used in
isolation. However, given the difficulties that are inherent in "blending" these approaches, further research
will be necessary to identify how the notions of mediated objectivity and critical subjectivity can be
effectively operationalised in IS development.
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